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Social Perception and Performance
Danyel Hancock
ABSTRACT

When stigmatized or oppressed groups are able to protect their self-esteem by
attributing a negative outcome to prejudice and/or discrimination, this has been titled
“attributional ambiguity”. Whereas it has been proven in many studies that attributional
ambiguity does exist among the stigmatized and oppressed groups the methodological
approach of these studies were bias. In these studies the evaluator(s) has always been
white and/or physically able. The goal of this study was to investigate whether
attributional ambiguity is utilized by any individual (stigmatized/oppressed or nonstigmatized/non-oppressed) who feels that their outcome as the result of prejudice and/or
discrimination. Our methodological approach allowed participants to be evaluated by
same-race, or cross-race evaluators of the same sex. It is believed that this did address
the issue of stigmatized/oppressed being evaluators themselves. However. The lack of
reported prejudice made it difficult to test the construct validity of attributional
ambiguity. In addition this study yielded results that revealed that subtle differences such
as skin color is not enough to imply prejudice even when paired with negative feedback.

v

INTRODUCTION
Attributional ambiguity has been defined as the ability to protect one’s self-esteem
by attributing negative feedback to prejudice and discrimination (Abramson, Metalsky, &
Alloy, 1989; Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Weiner, 1985, 1986). In recent
literature, attributional ambiguity has been used to explain the preservation of self-esteem
among those in stigmatized or oppressed social groups. Within the attributional ambiguity
framework, members of some stigmatized groups may suffer from negative affect and
low self-esteem.
These members generally do not recognize the negative consequences their
stigmatized conditions have on their functioning because they do not attribute their
functioning to prejudice and discrimination on the part of others. It is suggested that by
using attributional ambiguity, some stigmatized/oppressed individuals have been able to
discount the negative feedback from others. Thus, they have developed the ability to
buffer the effects of negative feedback on their self-esteem, which allows their selfesteem to be left virtually intact. A better understanding of how individuals utilize
attributional ambiguity can be obtained by further analyses of the following related
concepts: self-esteem, collective self-esteem, and stigmatized/oppressed groups.
The Elements of Attributional Ambiguity
Self-esteem
Self-esteem is related to attributional ambiguity in that self-esteem is precisely the
element that an individual attempts to protect. However, one may ask “is this self-esteem
worth protecting?” and “what exactly is self-esteem?” According to Rosenberg (1965),
self-esteem is a positive or negative attitude toward self. Self-esteem, however, has two
1

quite different connotations. Rosenberg suggests that one connotation of high self-esteem
is that the person thinks he or she is “very good”; a very different connotation is that he or
she thinks he or she is “good enough.” The latter makes it possible for a person to
consider himself or herself superior to most people while still feeling inadequate in terms
of certain personal standards. These connotations also allow for a person’s self-esteem to
be high in one domain but low in another.
High self-esteem, as reflected in Rosenberg’s (1965) scale items, reflects the
feeling that one is “good enough.” The individual feels that he or she is a person of worth.
Individuals respect themselves for what they are, but they do not consider themselves
superior to others. Individuals with high self-esteem do not consider themselves worse
than others; however, they recognize their limitations and expect to grow and improve.
Low self-esteem, on the other hand, implies self-rejection, self-dissatisfaction, or
self-contempt. Individuals with this quality lack respect for themselves, and their selfpicture is discordant with their “ideal self.” The ideal self is the representation of
attributes that ideally we would like to possess; it is the attribute that important others
hold for us and that we hold for ourselves. (Higgins, 1987, 1989).
Around 1965, researchers showed increased interest regarding the nature of selfesteem. Clinical and experimental studies had provided valuable insights into the nature
of self-esteem. Researchers knew very little, however, about the nature and distribution of
self-esteem, self-values, and self-perceptions in the broader society (Rosenberg, 1965).
Self-esteem was thought to be an element of self-image that could be measured separately
from the others. Rosenberg measured this single element of self-image and developed the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE). Rosenberg’s intent in developing the scale was to
measure how different social experiences, stemming from membership in groups
2

characterized by different values, perspectives, or conditions of existence, would bear
upon levels of self-esteem.
Since 1965, there have been more than 200 definitions of self-esteem, but there
appears to be no professional consensus on the construct of self-esteem. In 1989, Mecca
and Smelser formed a task force to study and define self-esteem. The formal definition of
the self-esteem construct seems to have several parts. There is first a cognitive element
that provokes a person to think about asking “what kind of person one is.” In order to
answer, self-esteem must be characterized in descriptive terms: power and confidence, for
example. Second, there is an affective element; a valence or degree of positivity or
negativity attached to the identified facets. Third, and related to the second, is an
evaluative element, an attribution of some level of worthiness according to some ideal
standard. That standard is another feature of self-esteem. Sometimes the standard reflects
an absolute sense of self-regard, measured against an ideal that one holds out for oneself;
sometimes it may be a relative standard, measuring one’s sense of self-worth in relation
to an internal aspiration or desired level of attainment. Sometimes the standard or point of
reference is mainly internal or psychological; sometimes it involves measuring one’s selfworth in relation to another person or group. In short, people’s self-definition and selfesteem are based on daily successes and failures, social comparisons with others, and
comparison with their own internal standards.
Self-esteem has both trait and state components. Because of these components,
the stability of self-esteem has been called into question. Popular intuitions about selfesteem suggest that it frequently changes, and this intuition has concerned researchers,
since a characteristic that fluctuates cannot be a trait. It seems, however, that self-esteem
is actually quite stable. In one study (Baumeister, 1991), a large sample of students
3

completed Rosenberg’s self-esteem measure on two occasions separated by two weeks.
The correlation (test–retest reliability) of their scores was .90, suggesting extreme
consistency. Fluctuations in self-esteem also do occur, as noted by Heatherton and Polivy
(1991). In their study, they developed a state measure of self-esteem (SSES) that can be
used to measure how an individual’s momentary self-evaluations fluctuate in response to
short-term events. They showed that the state measure correlates strongly with the
Rosenberg and Janis-Field trait measures of self-esteem (r=.72 and r=.76, respectively).
The implication is that self-esteem may change after a flattering or degrading event but it
will then return to a stable baseline.
Kernis and his colleagues have done a number of studies in the area of state
fluctuations of self-esteem. They found that attending to the stability of self-esteem adds
significant information over simply measuring the current level of esteem. For instance,
Kernis, Granneman, and Mathis (1991) showed that the correlation between self-esteem
and depression applies only to those people who show stable levels of self-esteem. This
finding must be coupled with the results that those individuals with unstable low selfesteem do not show elevated levels of depression. Kernis, Granneman, and Barclay
(1989) found that the highest levels of hostility and anger are found among people with
high, but unstable, self-esteem. People who have high opinions of themselves may feel in
danger of being deflated and may lash out at other individuals if events threaten to lower
their self-esteem. In contrast, individuals who have stable high self-esteem tend not to
become aggressive, because they are not as threatened by these events.
In regards to attributional ambiguity, self-esteem’s levels must be examined to
assess how these levels may affect the stigmatized/oppressed individuals’ ability to buffer
self-esteem when given negative feedback. This buffering may possibly be the result of
4

individuals’ having flexible “state” measures of self-esteem or stable “trait” measures of
self-esteem.
Collective Self-Esteem
Our self-esteem is not dependent just on our concept of ourselves; it is also related
to the groups with which we identify or with which we associate. Given this view, we
must take into account the second element of attributional ambiguity: collective selfesteem (CSE). Because CSE is used interchangeably with other terms in the literature, it
is important to explain the linkages. Tajfel and Turner (1979) term “social identity” as the
self-concept that is based on membership in groups or categories. Luhtanen and Crocker
(1992) refer to social identity as collective identity. According to Luhtanen and Crocker,
collective identity is used by individuals to develop their own collective self-esteem. Thus
by definition it appears that CSE, social identity, and collective identity all refer to the
same construct. Hence, CSE will be used to denote those facets of identity that have to do
with one’s membership in a particular social group and the value placed on one’s social
group.
Tajfel and Turner’s (1979, 1986) theory of social identity suggests that the selfconcept has two distinct aspects. One aspect includes specific attributes of the individual,
such as competence, talent, and sociability, which are labeled personal identity. The
other, social identity, is described as “that part of an individual’s self concept which
derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group together with the value
and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255). The key
difference between self- or personal-identity/esteem and collective-identity/esteem is the
focus on the characteristics of one’s groups, which may or may not also characterize
oneself. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell (1987) believe that “social self5

perception tends to vary along a continuum from the perception of self as a unique
person. . . to the perception of the self as an in group category.”
With these differences in mind, Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) developed a scale
that was designed to assess individual differences in collective, rather than personal, selfesteem. The scale is divided into four subscales of collective self-esteem. When
combined, these subscales yield a score that assesses an individual’s overall collective
self-esteem. This score may be use to assess how an individual’s self-esteem is related to
the group he or she is a member of.
Membership is related to attributional ambiguity in the concept of collective selfesteem, whereas the potential to buffer your self-esteem may not be as possible for an
individual. This buffer may exist as the result of being a proud member of a specific
group or of the group’s having a positive collective self-esteem. As noted, self-esteem
and collective self-esteem do correlate; however, there is a difference in the perception of
the self as a unique person and the perception of the self as a member of a group. As
elements of attributional ambiguity, both must be taken into account.
Stigmatized/Oppressed Groups
The third element of attributional ambiguity is the notion of
“stigmatized/oppressed groups”. According to Crocker and Major (1989), a
stigmatized/oppressed group is an “out-group” relative to the dominant group in a culture
or society. They further state that “out-groups are defined by non-membership in other
societal groups, regardless of which group holds the majority position in the society; and
are seen as homogenous.” “In-groups” hold negative attitudes, stereotypes, and beliefs
about these out-groups. On average, these stigmatized or oppressed social groups
experience disproportionately poor interpersonal or economic outcomes relative to
6

members of the society at large because their membership in the out-group elicits
discrimination. It is this prejudice and discrimination that has been theorized to have
influenced these individuals’ self-esteem.
Is it possible that the ability to not allow negative feedback to affect self-esteem
"buffering” occurs within individuals with certain self-esteem features? As noted earlier
in the review of the literature, features of self-esteem may contribute to an individual’s
ability to maintain his or her own high regard for self. Specifically, those who have very
high self-esteem may present the feature of arrogance and discount any feedback that is
not congruent with self-perception. Also those who have high self-esteem and see
themselves as “good enough” may be able to again discount negative feedback by taking
the stand that “oh well, no one is perfect.”
Finally the ability of an individual to maintain a certain level of self-esteem could
be influenced by his or her setting or “state.” For instance, if people who feel that they are
effective communicators find themselves among only Spanish-speaking individuals when
they themselves do not speak Spanish, their self-esteem as it relates to being an effective
communicator might be affected by this setting or state of events.
Self-esteem, as an element of attributional ambiguity, has been found to be
influenced by both trait and state features (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). To get an
accurate assessment of an individual’s buffering ability, an experimenter must assess the
trait or state features of self-esteem. An independent assessment of someone’s “state or
trait” can be accomplished by administering state or trait measures (Profile of Mood
States or State-Trait Personality Inventory, respectively). This type of assessment would
be helpful for understanding the buffering that occurs in relation to these features in
individuals in stigmatized or oppressed social categories. In addition, reviewing studies
7

that examine how stigmatized or socially oppressed individuals buffer their self-esteem
will promote further understanding of the concept of attributional ambiguity.
Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, Cornwell, and Major (1991) conducted two experiments
to investigate the hypothesis that stigmatized individuals can protect their self-esteem by
attributing negative feedback to prejudice. Self-esteem was measured by the Rosenbergscale (RSE) and the Janis & Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale (JFS). In the first
experiment, 59 women received feedback regarding their work performance from an
evaluator. This evaluator was identified as either prejudiced or not prejudiced by a survey
that was supposedly completed earlier by the evaluator. The evaluator’s completed survey
was given to participants in the study and they were allowed to read the evaluator’s
assessment of women. The survey included five items assessing positive or negative
attitudes toward women. These items were face valid and the participants were able to
assess the evaluator’s view of women (for example, “Women benefit more from divorce
than men do because they receive child support.” “Women who are less serious about
their jobs take jobs away from men with families to support.”)
Participants who received negative feedback from a supposedly prejudiced
evaluator attributed the feedback to his prejudice and reported a less depressed affect than
women who received negative feedback from a supposedly non-prejudiced evaluator.
Participants who received positive feedback experienced the same level of depressive
affect regardless of whether the evaluator was supposedly prejudiced or non-prejudiced.
The participants’ self-esteem level prior to receiving the evaluator’s feedback did
not predict how participants would respond to the evaluator. Self-esteem of the
participants (measured by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale) did not change from pre- to
post-test. The authors assumed that these were non-significant results and were due to the
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fact that the pre-test was taken far in advance (2–10 weeks) of the post-test and the testing
context was different (large group pre-testing vs. individual post-testing). The authors
also acknowledged that perhaps the self-esteem of women is not as vulnerable to
feedback from male evaluators as they had hypothesized. Women may not see their
gender as a stigmatized characteristic or, as related to the hypothesis, they may attribute
the negative feedback to the prejudice of others and discount others’ feedback in order to
protect their self-esteem.
Crocker, Cornwell, and Major (1993), investigated connections between the
stigma of being overweight and the consequences of attributional ambiguity. In their
experiment, 27 overweight and 31 normal-weight college women received either positive
or negative social feedback from a male evaluator. Compared to the normal weight
groups and overweight groups who received positive feedback, the overweight women
who received negative feedback were more likely to attribute the feedback to their
weight, but they did not blame the evaluator for his reaction. This attributional pattern
resulted in a more negative mood for the overweight women in comparison with other
groups. In this study, the negative outcomes were attributed to the stigmatized
characteristics (being overweight) and not to the prejudiced and discriminatory beliefs of
the evaluator. In this case, the stigma would not be self-protective, and the stigmatized
individuals would experience a more negative mood and perhaps lower self-esteem.
Blaine, Crocker, and Major (1995) used three studies to investigate the hypothesis
that positive outcome for stigmatized individuals who are motivated by sympathy may
have unintended negative consequences for self-esteem, affect, and motivation. In Study
2, participants (35 female students and 28 male students) were asked to imagine
themselves in two scenarios. The scenarios described the hiring of a stigmatized group
9

member (a wheelchair-bound, physically handicapped person) by an employer. In one
condition “sympathy for mobility” (having compassion and understanding for an
individual confined to a wheelchair) was expressed by the employer, and in the other
condition “sympathy for prejudice” (having compassion and understanding for an
individual belonging to a minority) was expressed by the employer.
The results showed that being hired on the basis of one’s qualifications resulted in
higher self-esteem, less depression, less hostility and more work motivation than being
hired on the basis of sympathy, whether the basis for the sympathy was prejudice and
discrimination or mobility problems. Participants reported significantly lower state selfesteem in the sympathy due to the prejudice condition than they did in the sympathy due
to the mobility problems condition (M=14.65 and M=18.28, respectively). This finding
would be expected according to Taylor and Dube (1986). They argued that any outcome
that is based on one’s social identity rather than one’s personal identity leads to more
anger and less satisfaction.
In Study 3, undergraduate students (72 females and 61 males) were given
scenarios. Students were asked to imagine they were female job applicants who were
offered a job by an employer. The employer expressed either sympathy related to
individual characteristics (person losing a love one, having a tough time finding a job) or
sympathy related to prejudice and discrimination (being a member of a minority group).
The results showed that sympathy had negative effects on depression, hostility, anxiety,
and self-esteem when the sympathy was based on either individual or group-based
problems imposed by the stigmatizing condition.
When stigmatized individuals are given help or sympathy, it may be unclear to
them if the help is motivated by feelings of care or by pity. If the stigmatized individual
10

perceives that the sympathy is derived from concern or caring, then assistance is
welcomed. If sympathy is perceived to be due to pity, however, the recipient feels inferior
to the sympathy-giver and may become angry.
This study links its findings about feelings to affirmative-action programs. It
suggests that such preferential treatment/sympathy may have a negative consequence for
its recipients, when positive outcomes such as being admitted to school or hired for a job
are attributed to one’s membership in a group rather than to one’s deservedness. A major
limitation of these findings is the limited generalizability based on the use of forcedchoice scenarios. These scenarios require the participant to attribute the employment to
sympathy, rather than relying on the participant’s own attribution.
Crocker, Voelkl, Cornwell, Testa, and Major (1991), studied 38 Black and 45
White students who received interpersonal feedback from a White evaluator. Half of the
students could be seen by the evaluator through a glass window in an adjacent room, and
half could not be seen by the evaluator because of a drawn curtain. Compared with
Whites, Blacks were more likely to attribute negative feedback to prejudice. Blacks were
also more likely to attribute both negative and positive feedback to prejudice when they
could be visually seen by the evaluator. Being seen by the evaluator buffered the selfesteem (as measured by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale) of Blacks from negative
feedback but hurt the self-esteem of Blacks who received positive feedback.
The authors suggested that those who were seen and received positive feedback
might have been particularly sensitive to the motives underlying the positive feedback
they received. In this experiment, it must be noted that someone of a different race always
evaluated the Black students, whereas someone of the same race always evaluated the
White students. This approach could have biased the results by reporting data (Black
11

students’ responses to being evaluated by someone of a different race) without comparing
these data to comparable results (White students’ responses to being evaluated by
someone of a different race).
In a study by Blaine, Crocker, and Major (1995), participants (111 EuropeanAmerican, 12 African-American, and 7 Asian college students) were asked to imagine
themselves in the position of a stigmatized person (African-American or female) who
received a job either because he or she was qualified or out of sympathy for a
stigmatizing condition. They were then asked to give ratings on self-esteem, motivation
for work, anxiety, hostility, and depression. Results indicated that all participants reported
lower self-esteem, more negative affect, and lowered work motivation when the job was
offered out of sympathy rather than on the basis of qualifications. The author also noted
that negative effects of being hired due to a history of discrimination against one’s group
hold regardless of whether the recipient of the positive outcome is African-American or
female. According to the author, these effects generalize across some stigmatized groups.
A limitation of this study is that the effects that are being reported are based on
role-playing methodology (i.e., the participants imagined they were African-American or
female). These results assume that actual members of these stigmatized groups would
respond in a similar way. Perhaps a better methodology would have been to select
participants who matched the demographics of the stigmatized groups (African-American
or female), thus producing actual, rather than role-playing, results.
The methodological approach in which all these studies have been carried out has
led these experimenters to the suggestion that attributional ambiguity occurs only within
these particular groups or with these particular members of these groups. In each of these
studies, when the stigmatized or oppressed social groups are given positive or negative
12

feedback, they are also being evaluated by only White evaluators. At no time are the
stigmatized or oppressed members evaluated by members of their own group or are
evaluators themselves. Accordingly, the evaluators of these studies, Whites, are not
considered for the utilization of attributional ambiguity.
The current study attempts to address whether attributional ambiguity reflects a
skill that is used by all individuals to preserve self-esteem when given biased feedback.
This goal will be accomplished by using procedures from the literature on attributional
ambiguity and expanding these procedures to evaluate dyads of African-Americans/White
evaluators and participants. Specifically, this study uses the following conditions to
investigate attributional ambiguity: (1) participant is African-American and the
confederate is African-American, participant receives negative feedback; (2) participant is
African-American and the confederate is White, participant receives negative feedback;
(3) participant is White and the confederate is White, participant receives negative
feedback; (4) participant is White and the confederate is African-American, participant
receives negative feedback.
The hypotheses that follow are based on the research literature:
Hypothesis 1
When negative feedback is given, it is expected that Whites who are evaluated by
Whites will show a decrease in self-esteem. African-Americans who are evaluated by
African-Americans are expected to show a decrease in self-esteem but to a lesser degree
than that of the Whites-evaluated-by-Whites group. Whites being evaluated by AfricanAmericans and African-Americans being evaluated by Whites will show a lesser decrease
in self-esteem than both of the other mentioned groups (Whites evaluated by Whites and
African-Americans evaluated by African-Americans). Support for these hypotheses will
13

demonstrate that Whites as well as African-Americans use attributional ambiguity to
protect self-esteem. In addition, these findings will extend the notion of attributional
ambiguity beyond oppressed or stigmatized groups.
Hypothesis 2
In support of the theory that attributional ambiguity exists in the presence of
prejudice, it is expected that individuals’ self-esteem will show a decrease when given
negative feedback by different-race evaluators who are seen as non-prejudiced. The
decrease in self-esteem of the participants who receive negative feedback and do not
perceive the evaluator as prejudiced should be greater than that of the other condition
(i.e., the case in which the evaluator is seen as prejudiced and negative feedback is given).

METHODS
Participants: Participants were 80 male and female undergraduate students at the
University of South Florida. Forty of the students were African-American (describing
themselves as Americans-African and having others perceive them as African-American)
and 40 of the students were White (non-Hispanic/Latino/Latina). Participants were
selected from psychology courses. All participants received extra credit points toward
their courses for their participation. A total of 80 (20 per condition) were needed to have
sufficient power of .80 for a “large effect” in a 2x2 between Participant ANOVA design
with alpha set at .05.
Measures:
State Self-Esteem Measure (see APPENDIX A)
The State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES) is a twenty (20) item 5-point Likert scale that
asks respondents to answer items using the following key:
14

1= not at all
2= a little bit
3= somewhat
4= very much
5= extremely
The scale consists of 20 items modified from the widely used Janis-Field Feelings
of Inadequacy Scale (Janis & Field, 1959). The Janis-Field is widely regarded as one of
the best measures of self-esteem (Briggs & Cheek, 1986; Crandall, 1973; Rodinson &
Shaver, 1973; however, its ability to measure “state” self-esteem as a result of laboratory
manipulations has not been successful (Baumeister, 1974; Nisbett & Gordon, 1967 ).
Thus the SSES fills a need for a measure of self-esteem that could detect those brief
instances when self-esteem fluctuates.
The theoretical concept of development of the SSES focuses on five areas:
academic, performance, social, appearance, and general self-esteem. Four items for each
of these five areas were chosen. However, through item loading and examination, three
factors (performance, social, and appearance) remained as the primary factors for this
scale. Performance is related to that portion of self-esteem that is dependent on how well
an individual completes a task. Social is related to that portion of self-esteem that is
dependent on the view of self by others. And appearance is related to that portion of selfesteem that is dependent on physical characteristics such as height, weight, and body
image.
Validity. Heatherton & Polivy (1991) used five studies to examine the construct
validity of the SSES. Studies 1 and 2 were conducted for psychometric reasons—to test
the factor structure of content validity of the scale. The findings of these studies were that
all of the items were positively intercorrelated, ranging from .09 to .69 (mean inter-item
correlation = .36; Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, X 2 (209, N= 428) = 4,287.7, p< .001. The
15

scale also yields a high degree of internal consistency (coefficient alpha + .92). Study 3
examined naturally occurring changes in self-esteem in a classroom setting. This study
was conducted in order to analyze the changes in self-esteem as a result of performance
requirements at certain periods of time, to provide support for the discriminant validity of
the SSES. Whereas it is expected that performance state self-esteem would be affected,
social and appearance self-esteem should remain about the same. The results yielded a
significant drop in performance state self-esteem—M difference = 1.28, t(121)= 4.17,
p<.0001—whereas there were no changes in social self-esteem—M difference = 0.42,
t(121) = 1.29, p > .10—or appearance self-esteem—M difference = 0.0. Study 4
demonstrated that the SSES was sensitive to laboratory manipulations of self-esteem. The
study used “task failure“ to manipulate participants self-esteem and measured self-esteem
after task. Participants were given a task that was easily completed in one minute if the
solution was known however, if the solution wasn’t know it could take well over ten
minutes. If the participants took over ten minutes they would be told that they failed the
task and the puzzle would be taken away. Participants were randomly assigned to three
groups. 1) Video condition- where subject were told that they were being video taped so
that, their solution to the puzzle could help others. 2) Bighorn condition-where
participants were ask to view a video about bighorn sheep and rate if the movie was
enjoyable after they attempted to complete the puzzle. 3) Control condition- where the
participants were ask to play with various puzzles for 10 minutes and state their
preference. Result form this study yielded that subject in the video conditions had
significantly reduced state self-esteem compared with the control condition, F(3,75) +
3.17, p< .05. The Bighorn condition did not differ from the control condition. However
an examination of the subscales of the SSES revealed significant treatment effects for
16

performance, F(3,75) = 4.28 p< .008 and social, F(3,75) = 3.96, p< .02, self esteem but no
for physical appearance self-esteem. This showed that the SSES was sensitive to
momentary changes in self-esteem in laboratory manipulations.
Luhtanen and Crocker Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES)
The Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES) (see APPENDIX B) is a 16 item, 7point Likert-type measure in which responses range from 1=strongly disagree, to
7=strongly agree (Luthanen & Crocker, 1992). This scale was used to measure the
collective self-esteem of the participants during the pre-test and post-test phases of this
study.
As stated before, this scale includes four subscales to arrive at a measure of
collective self-esteem. Membership esteem assesses the most individualistic aspect of
collective self-esteem and involve individuals’ judgments of how good or worthy they are
as members of their social groups. Private collective self-esteem measures individuals’
beliefs about their groups and how good they feel about being part of those groups. Public
collective self-esteem refers to one’s judgments of how other people evaluate one’s social
groups. This type of self-esteem has been referred to as “out sight” since it is the way the
individuals in a group believe others view their group. The final subscale was termed
identity esteem and assesses the importance of one’s social group membership to one’s
self-concept. This subscale reflects how important individuals feel they are by belonging
to these groups.
Initially, ten items were developed to assess each of these four domains, and three
additional items were included to assess the importance of being a good group member,
the importance of how one feels about one’s social groups, and the importance of how
others feel about one’s social groups. To shorten the total scale, four items were selected
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for each of the subscales (membership, private, public and identity), resulting in a final
16-item total Collective Self-Esteem Scale. The items for the four subscales were selected
on the basis of their highest loading on the appropriate factor (except for two items with
factor loadings of .58 and .62, all the selected items had loadings greater than .70), the
item total correlations (all the selected items correlated with the appropriate subscale
score at r = .55 or higher), and the criterion that two of the four items for each subscale
were to be worded in a negative direction (such items were reverse-scored). The final
four-item subscales correlated with the initial subscales at .90 or above.
The final 16 items were then submitted to a principal component analysis using
varimax rotation, which showed that 72.3% of the total variance was accounted for by
four factors. All the items loaded on the appropriate factors, ranging from .58 to .88.
Reliability.

Reliability analyses indicated that Cronbach’s (1955) alpha

coefficients and item-total correlations for the CSES were substantial for the subscales as
well as the total scale. The subscales ranged from .73 for the Membership subscale to .80
for the Public subscale. The total scale alpha was .85. The item-total correlations ranged
from .45 to .66 for the subscales and from .37 to .59 for the total scale.
Regarding reliability, a 6-week test-retest was conducted on the CSES and the
correlations were as follows: total scale r = .68; private subscale r= .62; identity subscale
r= .68; membership subscale r= .58; and public subscale r= .66. These correlations do
indicate that adequate test–retest reliability exists; however, there may be some shifting in
individuals’ levels of collective self-esteem over a 6-week period of time.
Validity. The Collective Self-Esteem Scale was moderately correlated (r = .36)
with the Rosenberg measure of self-esteem. However, the Membership subscale of the
CSES correlated higher with the Rosenberg measure than other subscales (r = .42). The
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Membership subscale measures one’s evaluation of the self in one’s social group. This
higher correlation may be the result of membership being related to trait features (i.e.,
race) and therefore correlating higher with a trait measure of self-esteem (RSE).
Collective self-esteem was also shown to correlate moderately r = .34) with
group-oriented measures such as Hui’s (1988) Individualism-Collectivism Scale. Validity
of the CSES was obtained in a study investigating the ability of the CSES to predict
behavior in an intergroup context (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990).
Participants high in private collective self-esteem reacted to collective threats
(negative group feedback) in an in-group–enhancing fashion, and participants low in
private collective self-esteem did not. These findings were parallel to those in an earlier
study by Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, and Ingerman (1987), which showed that
participants who were high in personal self-esteem reacted to average and below-average
scores in a self-enhancing manner.
College Level Academic Skills Test (Essay Rating)
The College-Level Academic Skills Test (CLAST) (see APPENDIX C)
is part of Florida’s system of educational accountability and is mandated by Section
229.551(3)(k), FS. The CLAST is an achievement test measuring students’ attainment of
college-level communication and mathematics skills identified by faculties of community
colleges and state universities through the College-Level Academic Skills Project
(CLASP).
The CLAST consists of four subtests: Essay, English Language Skills, Reading,
and Mathematics. For the purposes of this project we were focusing only on the Essay
portion of the CLAST.
The College Level Academic Skills Test Essay Rating contains 11 items and is
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rated on a six-point adjective rating scales. This measure was used to obtain a self-report
rating of the participant’s perceived ability to construct/write an essay. This measure will
assist in comparing data that relate to competency and self-esteem.
The essay portion of the CLAST was developed using holistic scoring. Holistic
scoring focuses on the overall impression that the essay has on the reader rather than on
the essay’s specific features. Holistic scoring assumes that the skills that make up the
ability to write are closely interrelated and that one skill cannot be separated from the
others. Thus, the essay is viewed as a total work in which the whole is something more
than the sum of the parts. The readers of the essay form an impression of the overall
quality of the essay and assign it a numerical rating based on their judgment of how well
the paper meets a particular set of established criteria. A six-point scale reflecting the
following performance levels is used to score CLAST essays.
Score of 6. The paper presents or implies a thesis that is developed with noticeable
coherence. The writer’s ideas are usually substantive, sophisticated, and carefully
elaborated. The writer’s choice of language and structure is precise and purposeful, often
to the point of being polished. Control of sentence structure, usage, and mechanics,
despite an occasional flaw, contributes to the writer’s ability to communicate the purpose.
Score of 5. The paper presents or implies a thesis and provides convincing, specific
support. The writer’s ideas are usually fresh, mature, and extensively developed. The
writer demonstrates a command of language and uses a variety of structures. Control of
sentence structure, usage, and mechanics, despite an occasional flaw, contributes to the
writer’s ability to communicate the purpose.
Score of 4. The paper presents or implies a thesis and often suggests a plan of
development, which is usually carried out. The writer provides enough support detail to
accomplish the purpose of the paper. The writer makes competent use of language and
sometimes varies sentence structure. Occasional errors in sentence structure, usage and
mechanics do not interfere with the writer’s ability to communicate the purpose.
Score of 3. The paper presents a thesis and often suggests a plan of development, which is
usually carried out. The writer provides support that tends toward generalized statements
or a listing. In general, the support is neither sufficient nor clear enough to be convincing.
Sentence structure tends to be pedestrian and often repetitious. Errors in sentence
structure, usage and mechanics sometimes interfere with the writer’s ability to
communicate the purpose.
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Score of 2. The paper usually presents a thesis. The writer provides support that tends to
be sketchy and/or illogical. Sentence structure may be simplistic and disjointed. Errors in
sentence structure, usage and mechanics frequently interfere with the writer’s ability to
communicate the purpose.
Score of 1. The paper generally presents a thesis that is vaguely worded or weakly
asserted. Support, if any, tends to be rambling and/or superficial. The writer uses
language that often becomes tangled, incoherent and thus confusing. Errors in sentence
structure, usage, and mechanics frequently occur.
Reliability. A study by the Department of Education (CLAST Technical Report
1992–1993) indicates that the test-r test correlation for the essay portion of the CLAST
was .86 over a period of four months.
Profile of Mood States (POMS)
The Profile of Mood State (POMS) in its present form is a 65 5-point adjective
rating scale. This measure was used to assess the mood of the participants during the pretest and post-test phases of this study. It is essential that the participant’s mood be
measured to ensure that findings are a result of experimental manipulations and not just a
product of the participant’s general state prior to manipulation.
The POMS was originally a set of 55 scales assembled by Nowlis and Green
(1957) and Sells et al. (1956). Scales have been added and deleted from the original set
on the basis of a series of six factor-analytic studies. The Thorndike-Lorge (1944) word
lists were consulted to restrict the adjectives in the POMS to those that an average
individual can easily understand. Typically, persons with at least a 7th-grade education
have little or no difficulty in understanding the POMS.
The POMS was designed to depict an individual’s typical and persistent mood
reactions to his or her current life situation, and it is sufficiently short to assess acute
treatment effects. Generally, individuals are asked to assess their feelings during the past
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week; however, other time frames have been used with the POMS. Shorter rating periods
such as “today,” “right now,” and even “the past three minutes” have been used
successfully. For the purpose of this study, the “right now” version was used.
Six independent factor-analytic studies have been conducted in the development
and validation of the POMS. These studies indicate that the same six mood factors can be
identified, measured reliably, and replicated in the respective population. According to
McNair, D. et al (1971), the six clearly defined POMS factors are Tension-Anxiety (T),
Depression-Dejection (D), Anger-Hostility (A), Vigor-Activity (V), Fatigue-Inertia (F),
and Confusion-Bewilderment (C). Factor T is defined by heightened musculoskeletal
tension, reports of somatic tension, as well as observable psychomotor manifestations.
Factor D represents a mood of depression accompanied by a sense of personal
inadequacy. Factor A represents a mood of anger and antipathy towards others. Factor V
is defined by using adjectives that reflect a mood of vigor, ebullience, and high energy.
Factor F represents a mood of weariness, inertia, and low energy level. Factor C is
characterized by bewilderment and muddle-headedness.
Reliability. Internal consistency for all scales is highly satisfactory, yielding near
.90 or above for all six mood scales. Test–retest analyses were conducted on a normative
group of patients who were accepted for treatment at a university medical center
psychiatry clinic (Haskell & McNair, 1969). Those who entered treatment were assessed
once immediately prior to their first therapy session and again after six weeks of
treatment. A subset of patients were tested 20 days after intake to provide a rough
estimate of stability without the intervention of treatment. The reliability estimates range
from .65 for Vigor to .74 for Depression. The overall test–retest correlations ranged from
.47 to .74 for Depression and .43 to .65 for Vigor. It is unlikely to find the high levels of
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.80 to .90 in test–retest of mood states. These levels would be expected when measuring
personality traits but not measures of mood. In another study by McNair and Lorr (1964),
the test–retest reliability for the six factors on the POMS ranged from .61 to .69. The
results were remarkably congruent for the different patient and control samples, for the
different rating time periods, and for the 4-point and 5-point scales.
Validity. Concurrent validity was established by correlating the POMS with
similar types of instruments. The Hopkins Symptom Distress Scale was used to the assess
Factor D, and it was found that the distress scores of Anxiety and Depression correlated
.72 and .86 respectively with the POMS Factor D. Factor T had a correlation of .80 when
compared with the Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS). When correlated with the MMPI-2, it
was noted that the Hypochondriasis scale (Hs) of the MMPI-2 correlated with Tension,
Anger, Fatigue, and Confusion as expected. With the Depression Scale, the POMS has
the highest correlations for Depression (r = .65) and Confusion (r = .67). Vigor correlated
negatively with Hysteria (Hy) -.51 and Psychasthenia (Pt) -.44. The Paranoia (Pa) scale
correlated .59 with Depression and .51 with Anger of the POMS. Finally, the
Schizophrenia (Sc) scale correlated .69 with Depression and .66 with Confusion. Overall,
the POMS has shown evidence of good validity.
State-Trait Personality Inventory (STPI)
The STPI consists of six 10-item scales that reflect acute and dispositional
curiosity, anxiety, and anger (Spielberger, 1979). This measure was used to assess the
mood of the participants during the pre-test and post-test phases of this study. If
attributional ambiguity is to exist among any individual regardless of situation, then it is
essential that the participant’s mood be measured to insure that findings are the result of
experimental manipulation and not just a product of the participant’s general state.
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The four state subscales of the STPI are referred to as S-Anxiety, S-Curiosity, SAnger and S-Depression. The four trait subscales are referred to as T-Anxiety, TCuriosity, T-Anger and T-Depression. For the purposes of this research, only the state
subscales were used as a measure of mood.
Participants respond to the STPI state items in terms of how they feel at that
moment by rating themselves on the following four-point scale: (1) not at all; (2)
somewhat: (3) moderately so; and (4) very much so.
Reliability and Validity. Psychometric properties of the STPI are included in the
Preliminary Test Manual (Spielberger et al., 1999) and other sources (Westberry, 1980;
Crane, 1981; Russell, 1981). Coefficient alphas for the STPI range from .80 to .87. The
test–retest correlations for the trait scales range from .61 to .81 and the test–retest stability
coefficients for the individual STPI state scales range from .21 to .44. Populations were
generally consistent with expectations.
Design
This study used a 2 x 2 design, with race of participant (African-American or
White) as one factor and race of evaluator (same as participant or different from
participant) as the other factor. Participants took part in only one condition of the study;
hence this was a between-subject design. The dependent variables were the residual
scores of the self-esteem and the collective self-esteem scales. Residualizing pre- and
post-test scores removed from the post-test scores the portion that could have been
predicted linearly from pre-test status. The residualized score was used to identify
individuals who changed more than expected. This type of change is related to growth or
training. The grouping variable was the race of the participant, either African-American
or White. The independent variable was the race of the evaluator compared to the race of
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the participant (same or different). Also two “state-like” measures were used: the POMS
and “state” scales of the STPI.
PROCEDURE
The participants were randomly assigned to each independent variable. That is,
regardless of whether the participant was African-American or White, he or she had an
equal chance of being assigned to either race combination. As each pair of same-race
participants were recruited for the study, a coin was tossed. The coin toss determined
whether the first participant was assigned to the “same” group (heads) or the “different”
group (tails). The second participant was always assigned to the opposite group from the
first participant.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the study used the following cells: (1) participant was
African-American and the confederate was African-American; (2) participant was
African-American and the confederate was White; (3) participant was White and the
confederate was White; and (4) participant was White and the confederate was AfricanAmerican. The confederate was always the same gender as the participant and all
participants received negative feedback.
FIGURE 1
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There was some concern regarding random sampling. By using college students,
one may be limiting the generalizability of the study. The use of college students,
however, is standard practice in this field. It is recognized that this is an issue, but not one
that decreases internal validity within experiments.
Another question concerned the possibility that results could be affected by which
confederates were used in the various trials. Even though confederates were trained the
same and were similar in appearance, analyses were conducted to test if there was a
difference between confederates on any of the dependent variables. There were a total of
10 confederates utilized in the study (2 African-American males, 2 White males, 2
African-American females, and 4 White females). Initially only two White female
confederates were recruited to participate; however, when they became unavailable an
additional two White female confederates were recruited as replacements. Each
confederate was given a number code to indicate his or her involvement with participant.
Another concern was the sensitivity to short-term, state-like variation of the
Luhtanen and Crocker’s Collective Self-Esteem Scale. It has been reported that the test–
retest reliability of this measure for a six-week period is .80 or greater. This level of
reliability was cause for concern because the scales solicit responses reflecting behavior
traits. The issue was addressed by modifying the instructions such that participants’
responses reflect their current assessment of esteem (e.g., “At this moment, I feel am a
worthy member of the social groups I belong to”) and avoid responses based on
cumulative experience (e.g., “ I feel am a worthy member of the social groups I belong
to”). It was possible that this technique might have altered the psychometric properties of
these scales in an unpredictable fashion. However, this technique was employed in all
conditions, so any effects of this modification were present in all conditions.
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The order of the administration of the scales remained the same for all conditions.
The order of the measures was as follows: Essay Competency rating, pre-test-SSES, pretest-CSES, POMS, STPI, post-test-SSES, and post-test-CSES. The study was conducted
in two phases. In the initial phase, the experimenter recruited participants from
psychology classes. This study was presented to potential participants as an experiment
assessing how college students select their friends. During initial contact, the
experimenter asked the potential participants to provide demographic information and fill
out the Essay Competency Rating Scale (see Appendix D). Then the experimenter
contacted participants who were appropriate for the second phase of the study (AfricanAmerican and White students). The data of participants who were not African-American
or White were not used.
The second phase took place approximately two weeks later in a lab setting. The
participants were met by the experimenter/confederate and were reminded that the study
involved determining how college students select their friends. The same-sex
experimenter/confederate introduced himself or herself as a graduate student studying
Psychology and English. Stating that the confederate was majoring in English established
a presumption that the confederate was competent to evaluate the participant’s essay.
Participants were informed that the confederate was evaluating their ability to write an
essay regarding the topic of choosing friends. They also were informed that those essays
that are evaluated as excellent might be quoted and published along with the results of the
study. Participants were led into individual experimental rooms separate from the
confederate.
The participants were asked to complete the State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES), the
Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES), the Profile of Mood States (POMS), and the
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“state” portion of the State-Trait Personality Inventory (STPI). After these scales were
completed, the participants were instructed to use the intercom system in the room to
inform the experimenter/confederate that they had completed the scales. Once the
participants informed the experimenter/confederate that they had completed the scales,
they were asked to take 10 minutes and write a brief essay titled "What characteristics are
important in choosing a friend?” The participants were informed that the experimenter
was timing them and would use the intercom system to let them know when their time
had elapsed.
After 10 minutes had elapsed, the experimenter/confederate used the intercom to
notify the participants. When the experimenter/confederate notified the participants that
their time is up he or she “mistakenly” locked the intercom system on audible, ostensibly
allowing the participant to overhear the experimenter/confederate comments. The
experimenter/confederate then returned to the experimental room to collect the
participant’s materials. The participant was given an essay rating form and told these
were the areas that the experimenter/confederate was assessing. The
experimenter/confederate informed the participant that he or she would return in five
minutes with the results of the essay. The experimenter/confederate allowed five minutes
to elapse. During this time the participant was exposed to pre-scripted negative feedback
via the intercom system.
Next the experimenter/confederate returned to the experimental room to collect
the essay rating scale from the participant and returned the evaluation of the participant’s
essay. The feedback on the essay evaluation mimicked the “pre-scripted conversation.”
The feedback included specific area ratings, from 1 to 6, an overall essay rating, and a
brief statement. The participant rating averaged 2.5 (which falls between 2 [poor] and 3
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[fair]), the overall essay rating was 2, and the brief statement stated “Your word choice
and sentence structure is poor. This made it difficult to determine what the main idea of
the essay was.”
The experimenter asked the participant to redo the self-evaluation forms (State
Self-Esteem Scale, Luhtanen & Crocker’s Collective Self-Esteem, the Profile of Mood
States and the State-Trait Personality Inventory), supposedly because proper procedures
had not been followed the first time the self-evaluations had been administered. After
participants complete the second administration, they were given questions that allowed
them to rate how they perceived themselves and how they felt others might perceive
them. Specifically, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt the
other student's response to them was due to their race, the other student's racism, the other
student's discrimination and the competence level of the evaluator. The first three items
are conceptually similar and form an index of attributions to racism with acceptable
internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha=.76). Consequently, the first three items were
combined into a single measure, with a possible range from 3 to 15, with higher numbers
indicating more attribution to prejudice (Dovidio & Gardner 1986). The last item is a face
valid item in which participant’s response is recorded accordingly.
A manipulation check was done to assess the degree to which participants
believed the deception. Participants were told that the Ethics Committee of the
Department of Psychology is very concerned that subjects be treated fairly. They were
asked to respond to a survey that asks if they were deceived in any way by participating in
this study. Participants could reply either “yes” or “no.” Participants were also told that
the experimenter would not see their responses and their responses would not affect any
benefits they were entitled to by participating in the study. If the deception was not
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successful (i.e., participants reported that they realized that they had been deceived) and
participants indicated that they did not believe that the confederate did, in fact, evaluate
them, then these data were omitted from the study. There were eleven cases in this study
in which participants felt the confederate’s rating was a deception. Data from these
participants were excluded from all analyses.
Participants were debriefed and all deceptions of the study were revealed to them.
They were informed that the experimenter was not really an English major and that in no
way were the responses they received from the experimenter/confederate an accurate
assessment of their writing skills. In addition, an educational debriefing form was given
to them that described previous research in this area. Participants were also provided
contact numbers that would enable them to obtain counseling services if they experienced
any post-experiment mood discomfort. Finally participants were given extra-credit slips
for participation and dismissed.
Results
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS/WIN 9.0: 1998) was used
for all analyses. A 2 x 2 between-subject analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used,
followed by planned comparisons as needed. This test was an appropriate test because the
data were measured on an interval/ratio scale, the scores were expected to be normally
distributed, and the populations that the different samples came from were expected to
have equal variances. The experimenter validated these assumptions before the analyses.
Preliminary Data Analysis

One-way analyses of variance were conducted on the “confederate evaluating the

participant” and the dependent variables “pre- and post-test residual scores” of the SSES
(F (9, 79) = .387, p>.05) and the CSES (F (9, 79) = 1.56, p > .05). None were significant.
Additional one-way analysis of variances were conducted on the “confederate evaluating
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the participant” and the mood scale scores both pre- and post-test of the POMS
(F (9, 79) = 3.391, p>.05 and F (9, 79) = 2.81, p>.05, respectively) and the STPI (F (9,
79) = .716, p>.05 and F (9,79) = 1.01, p>.05, respectively). Again none were significant.
Residual scores were obtained for esteem scores (state and collective).
Computations of residual scores were derived by expressing the post-test scores of the
esteem measures as a deviation from the post-test–on–pre-test regression line (“true
differences”). This method allows the part of the post-test information that is linearly
predictable from the pre-test to be partialled out. According to Lord and McNemar
(1958), this measurement of differences is more representative of change than that of pretest minus post-test differences (“raw differences”). Justification for this method is given
by addressing retention and transfer of responses when a measure is given twice in one
sitting. Hence a person’s true score within the same operation is kept distinct.
The residualized score is primarily a way of singling out those individuals who
change more or less than expected. The State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES) and the
Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES) both had overall and subscales scores. Residuals
were computed for all pre-test and post-test scores and recorded in the appropriate
condition. These computed residuals scores represent the dependent variable in this study.
Group means were compared in order to investigate whether mood diminished
differentially from pre-test to post-test. No significant between-group differences were
found for the self-reported mood measure’s residuals, POMS (F (3, 79) = .504, p > .05) or
STPI (F (3, 79) = 2.161, p > .05). It was suggested that participants’ moods might
diminish in a way that all participants end up at a similar, low mood level (Figure 2,
Alternative 1). All participants obtaining the same or similar post-test score regardless of
pre-test score or group would evidence this effect.
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As indicated by Table 1, means scores of the mood measure pre-test were not
significantly different between groups. Also each group mood measure had different, but
not significantly different, post-test means. This result fails to support the notion of
Alternative 1, namely that mood may have diminished in a way that all participants’ posttest scores would be the same or similar regardless of pre-test score or group (see Table
1).
Another alternative (Figure 2, Alternative 2) suggested that mood may diminish in
a way that reflects participants’ “feeling worse” at post-test than pre-test, but with those at
higher mood pre-test still being elevated over those at post-test. As indicated by the
comparative means results, a numeral difference exists between the pre-test, post-test, and
group results. In most cases those whose pre-test mood was high maintained a higher
mood pattern during post-test compared to those who reported lower pre-test mood.
However, the group’s pattern in which African-American participants (Afri-Amer.-Pt)
were evaluated by White evaluators (White-Conf) indicated “feeling worst” in
comparison to all other groups’ patterns, regardless of whether pre-test mood was greater
or less than the other groups. Again these are being reported only as patterns of numerical
difference and cannot be interpreted as a statistically significant difference, likely because
of the numerical value because of large standard deviations (see Table 1).
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Figure 2. Pre- and Post-test Patterns

ALTERNATIVE 2

ALTERNATIVE 1

100

100

80

80

60

60

40

40

20

20

0

0
Pre-test

Post-test

Pre-test

Post-tes t
pt. 1

pt. 1

pt. 2

pt. 2

pt. n

pt. n

Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for Mood Scales
Group

Black Ss – Black Conf
Mean
N

POMS
Pre-test
Total
Scores

POMS
Post-test
Total Scores

SPTI
Pre-test
Total Scores

SPTI
Post-test
Total
Scores

44.4000
20
38.4563

44.8000
20
39.9955

74.4000
20
13.9412

78.5000
20
18.7743

39.7500
20
38.0247

49.7000
20
54.5417

75.3500
20
17.7238

88.5000
20
23.5785

Std. D
Black Ss – White Conf
Mean
N
Std. D
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White Ss – White Conf
Mean
N

19.1500
20
30.2207

27.9500
20
43.2416

71.9000
20
11.2245

80.1500
20
16.9528

19.8000
20
25.7674

21.4500
20
35.4660

71.2500
20
11.0018

73.6000
20
15.8791

30.7750
80
34.8548

35.9750
80
44.5836

73.2250
80
13.5879

80.1875
80
19.4280

Std. D
White Ss – Black Conf
Mean
N
Std. D
Total
Mean
N
Std. D
* Higher scores indicate greater mood disturbance.
Correlational analysis was conducted to determine if there was a significant
relationship between residual esteem scores and post-test mood state. Many
researchers (Brockner & Elkind, 1985; Baumeisiter & Tice, 1985; McFarland &
Ross,1982; Sorman, 1977) have reported changes in participants’ mood following
manipulation of esteem. This analysis may provide support that the data obtained are
a direct result of the manipulation of the independent variable (race) and not one of
the participants’ overall traits. If this notion is true, there must be a significant
correlation between the residualized esteem scores and the post-test mood scores.
According to Spielberger et al. (1999), traits moods are somatic characteristic
pattern of behavior or a predisposition to feel and act in a particular way. State moods
are those behaviors or feelings that are greatly influenced by a particular event or
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situation. Given this distinction, if participants’ esteem was influenced by their
situation and not their overall characteristic pattern, a strong correlation should exist
between the residual esteem score and the post-test mood score. Alternatively, if
participants’ esteem was an overall characteristic pattern, then a strong correlation
should have existed between the residual esteem score and the pre-test mood score.
The results yielded significant correlations between collective self-esteem residual
(CSES), state self-esteem residual (SSES), Profile of Mood Scale post-test (POMS)
and State-Trait Personality Inventory post-test (STPI) (see Table 2). Only a
summation of the four state subscales of STPI (anxiety, curiosity, anger and
depression) was used in these analyses. This same summation procedure is utilized by
the POMS, which is a “state only” measure of mood. These results indicate that the
manipulation of the independent variable (race) has a directional influence with
“state” post-test mood scores. This significant relationship is shown to exist only in
the post-test mood scores – esteem residual and not the pre-test mood score – esteem
residual (Table 3). If results were linked to the participants’ overall traits, it would be
expected that a significant relationship would be found in both pre-test and post-test
mood score – esteem residual. Hence the results seem to reflect the manipulation of
the independent variable and not the participants’ overall traits.
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Table2 Esteem Residual and Mood Post-Test Correlations
CSES pre-post
SSES total POMS post- STPI post-test
total score
test total
total residual
pre-post
scores
residual
CSES pre-post
1.000
.321**
-.346**
-.275*
total residual
SSES total
.321**
1.000
-.511**
-.472*
pre-post
residual
POMS post-.346**
-.511**
1.000
.780**
test total
scores
STPI post-test
-.275*
-.472**
.780**
1.000
total score
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

N= 80 for all groups

Table3 Esteem Residual and Mood Pre-Test Correlations
CSES
SSES POMS
SSES
pre-post total pre- pre-test pre-test
total
post
total
total
residual residual
scores
score
CSES
1.000
.321**
-.075
.099
pre-post
total
residual
SSES .321**
1.000
-.040
.000
total prepost
residual
POMS
-.075
-.040
1.000 -.531**
pre-test
total
scores
SSES
.099
.000 -.531**
1.000
pre-test
total
score
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Participants’ esteem may be affected by their perceptions of an evaluator’s
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competence to judge. If participants felt that evaluators were not trained or skilled in the
area that they were evaluating, then their evaluation of the participant may not have had
any merit. This perception may create a confound that effects the participants’ esteem in
the same manner as attributional ambiguity. Evaluators’ perceived competence was
measured by the participants. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted
to investigate if the competency ratings varied as a function of the four principal
conditions. No significant differences were found on the perceived evaluator
competency (F (3, 79) = .313, p = > .05). The means were as presented in Table 4.
Table 4. Competence rating of evaluator by participants
GROUP
Mean
N
Std.
Deviatio
n
Black Ss 3.5000
20
.7609
– Black
Conf
Black Ss 3.3500
20
.8127
– White
Conf
White Ss 3.4500
20
.5104
– White
Conf
White Ss 3.5500
20
.6048
– Black
Conf
Total 3.4625
80
.6740
Primary Data Analyses
The first hypothesis posited that Whites who are evaluated negatively by Whites
would show a decrease in self-esteem. African-Americans who are evaluated negatively
by African-Americans would also show a decrease in self-esteem but to a lesser degree
than that of the Whites-evaluated-by-Whites group. Whites evaluated negatively by
African-Americans and African-Americans evaluated negatively by Whites would show
a lesser decrease in self-esteem then either of the previously mentioned groups. The
37

majority of individuals, both African-Americans and Whites, would use attributional
ambiguity to preserve self-esteem. This hypothesis was not supported. There were no
significant between-group differences found for participants’ collective self-esteem
residuals (F (3, 76) = .586, p> .05) or state self esteem residuals (F (3, 76) = 1.628, p >
.05).
The second hypothesis posited that if attributional ambiguity existed, it would be
expected that individuals’ self-esteem would have shown a decrease when given
negative feedback by different-race evaluators who were seen as non-prejudiced. The
decrease in self-esteem of the participants who received negative feedback and did not
perceive the evaluator as prejudiced should have been greater than that of the other
condition (the evaluator is seen as prejudiced and negative feedback is given).
This second hypothesis could not be investigated due to the equality of the
independent variable “participant’s discrimination rating of the evaluator.” The mean
rating of the perceived discrimination rating of the evaluator as a function of group is
depicted in Table 5. As noted, all groups had similar mean ratings of evaluator’s
prejudice. The score averaged 3.0, indicating that participants felt that evaluators were
non-prejudiced. Because this perception was present in all groups, there is no prejudice
to compare the effects of self-esteem and negative feedback.
Additional analyses were conducted to investigate if there were differences in self-esteem
among participants who rated evaluators as “low” non-prejudiced and those who rated
evaluators as “medium” non-prejudiced. A univariate analysis of variance yielded no significant
differences between African-Americans and Whites with regard to self-esteem residuals CSEC
(F (3, 64) = .462, p> .05) and SSES (F (3, 64) = 1.292, p> .05) when the participants rated the
evaluator “low” non-prejudiced. The results of African-American and White participants who
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rated the evaluators as “medium” non-prejudiced also indicated that self-esteem did not differ
significantly between the groups on either measure CSEC (F (3, 14) = .823, p> .05) and SSES
(F (3, 14) = .998, p> .05).

Table 5. Total Score for Prejudice Rating
GROUP
Mean
N
Std.
Deviation
Black Ss - 3.1500
20
.3663
Black
Conf
Black Ss - 3.0500
20
.2236
White
Conf
White Ss 3.1500
20
.3663
- White
Conf
White Ss 3.2500
20
.4443
- Black
Conf
Total 3.1500
80
.3593
Discussions
The attributional ambiguity theory concerns the protection of self-esteem by
members of some stigmatized groups when negative feedback from non-stigmatized
groups is attributed to prejudice or discrimination. Based on this premise, it was expected
that those individuals who were evaluated by members of a different race (AfricanAmerican participant–White confederate or White participant–African-American
confederate) would have shown a lesser effect on self-esteem when given negative
feedback than those evaluated by those of the same race (African-American participant–
African-American confederate or White participant–White confederate). According to the
literature (Festinger, 1954; Goethals & Darley, 1977), individuals evaluated by others
who are similar or have certain relevant attributes tend to assume that the evaluator is
more informed and accurate in personal appraisal. It was expected that Whites evaluated
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by Whites and African-Americans evaluated by African-Americans would show a greater
negative effect on self-esteem when given negative feedback than Whites evaluated by
African-Americans and African-Americans evaluated by Whites.
As reported earlier there were no significant differences between these groups.
However it must be noted that empirical research is generally consistent with attributional
ambiguity theory. For example, Crocker et al. (1991) found in one experiment that
women who received negative feedback from a prejudiced evaluator attributed the
feedback to his prejudice and reported less depressed affect than women who received
negative feedback from a non-prejudiced evaluator. In the second experiment Crocker
also found that compared to Whites, African-Americans were more likely to attribute
negative feedback to prejudice than positive feedback. Dion (1986) showed that women
who attribute negative evaluations to the prejudice of a male evaluator tended to be
higher in self-esteem. Since it is empirically evidenced that attributional ambiguity exists,
one must question the non-significant results of the present study.
The function of power was examined to ensure that the non-significant results
were not a product of lack of power. A “large” effect was expected based on similar
experiments conducted in regards to attributional ambiguity (i.e. Crocker et al. 1991).
The simple size needed to find a “large” effect according to typical psychology research
journals is n =17 for a power of .80 when alpha = .05. In the present study n = 20 and the
power = .85 when alpha = .05. An alterative to”large” effect expectancy is a “small”
effect; to obtain reasonable amounts of power .80 you must assign 271 subjects to each of
the four conditions, which would yield 1084 subjects. Given the complexity of this
design the collecting of 1084 subjects seemed impractical as an alterative.
The large standard deviation between the mood measures pretest –posttest as a
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function of group (see Table 1) was also a concern. However after analyzing controlling
for confederate used, day of experiment, and rating of essay writing ability it seems that
these large variability between pretest and posttests mood measure are accurate. The
correlation of between the two measures also justified the large standard deviation.
Meaning that when one group’s standard deviation was large on one mood measure the
same group standard deviation was large on the other mood measure.
Limitation of Study
According to the attributional ambiguity framework, members of a stigmatized
group would not suffer from negative affect and low-self esteem when given negative
feedback from an evaluator whom they perceive as prejudiced. The perception of
prejudice is a key factor is the utilization of attributional ambiguity. It is this perception
that allows the individual to justify or explain negative actions or comments of the
evaluator. Prejudice is defined as an adverse judgment or opinion formed beforehand
about a particular group, race, or religion without knowledge or examination of the facts.
When an individual perceives someone as “prejudiced,” it is usually the result of
another’s behavior or statements toward that individual.
In this study we used statements (negative feedback) and visual cues (differentrace confederate African-American/White) in an attempt to elicit, but not force, the
presumption of prejudice. This method had been used in another study that produced
significant results (Crocker, Voekkl, Cornwell, Testa, and Major, 1991). Therefore, there
was a reasonable expectation that the method of visual differences would promote a sense
of prejudice. However, as noted in Table 5, all groups, regardless of participant’s or
confederate’s race, felt that the confederate was non-prejudiced. These neutral scores of
prejudice suggest that there was a need for a more overt way of indicating the presence of
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the rater’s prejudice when attempting to investigate attributional ambiguity within this
study. The neutrality of the prejudice rating is further evidenced by the lack of standard
deviations for the different groups. The lack of variability between these groups may be
explained by the confederates being “friendly, likeable and not aloof” as described by
participants when asked to rate confederates In short, the generalization of attributional
ambiguity may have been affected by the artificial manipulation presented in this study.
Conclusions

Questions remain regarding the utilization of attributional ambiguity by all
members of society. It remains to be seen whether attributional ambiguity is only
effective when utilized by members of stigmatized/oppressed groups or whether it can be
equally effective when utilized by non-stigmatized/non-oppressed groups, with the only
required variable being perceived prejudice. The investigative strategy must include a
manipulation variable that ensures that individuals will assume prejudice. Subtle visual
cues, such as differences in race, are not guaranteed to elicit a presumption of prejudice.
This absence of the presumption of prejudice could be a positive indication that times
have changed and that individuals need more information about each other, other than
visual differences, before prejudging one another.
There is still the concern that the majority of the studies on attributional ambiguity
use Whites as evaluators. This methodology neglects the possibility that members of
stigmatized groups may feel that members of their own group may be prejudiced. What
effects, if any, would this have on their self-esteem? How would non-stigmatized groups
respond to being evaluated by members of stigmatized groups and would this affect their
self-esteem? We do know that an individual’s self-esteem has both “state” and “trait”
features, and that in certain negative states an individual’s self-esteem will decrease.
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What we have failed to determine is how and if internal interpretation or perception
protects self-esteem. Moreover, is this buffering of self-esteem an attribute that is
displayed only by stigmatized or oppressed individuals? This empirical question needs to
be addressed in future studies.
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APPENDIX C
ESSAY RATING
Case#
This is a scale that is use to rate how well you write an essay. Below are specific features
that are contained in an essay. Please rate how skillful you are at performing the
following tasks. Use the following scale:
1=I do not have this skill
2= Poor
3= Fair
4= Good
5= Very Good
6= Excellent
1

2

3

4

5

Formulating a Thesis or Main Idea statement which focuses
the essay.
Writing about a subject within a required amount of time for
a particular audience.
Arranging ideas and supporting details in an organizational
pattern.
Demonstrating effective word choice
(Avoiding inappropriate use of slang, jargon, and pretentious
expressions).
Developing effective sentence structure.
Maintaining a consistent point of view.
Using standard practice for spelling, punctuation, and
capitalization.
Revising, editing, and proofreading.
Writing such that all supporting material is relevant to the
thesis or main idea.
Using transitional phrases clearly to reflect the
organizational pattern.
Overall rating of Essay Writing Ability.
Comments:
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
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6

APPENDIX B

CSES
Case#
Please indicate which category best describes how you feel at this moment. Check one
space after each question.
1= Strongly Disagree 3= Disagree somewhat
5= Agree Somewhat
2= Disagree
4= Neutral
6= Agree
7= Strongly Agree
1

2

3

4

5

At this moment I feel am a worthy member of the social groups I
belong to.
At this moment I regret that I belong to some of the social
groups I do.
I feel my social groups are considered good by others.
At this moment my group memberships have very little to do
with how I feel about myself.
I feel I don’t have much to offer to the social groups I belong to.
At this moment, I’m glad to be a member of the social groups I
belong to.
Most people consider my social groups, on the average, to be
more ineffective than other social groups.
The social groups I belong to are an important reflection of who
I am.
I am a cooperative participant in the social groups I belong to.
I often feel that the social groups of which I am a member are
not worthwhile.
Others respect the social groups that I am a member of.
The social groups I belong to are unimportant to my sense of
what kind of a person I am.
At this moment I feel I’m a useless member of my social groups.
I feel good about the social groups I belong to.
Others think that the social groups I am a member of are
unworthy.
Belonging to social groups is an important part of my selfimage.
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APPENDIX A
SSES
CASE#
This is a questionnaire designed to measure what you are thinking at this moment. There
is, of course, no right answer for any statement. The best answer is what you feel is true
of yourself at this moment. Be sure to answer all of the items, even if you are not certain
of the best answer. Again, answer these questions as they are true for you RIGHT NOW.
Check one space after each question.
1= Not at all 3= Somewhat 5= Extremely
2= A little bit 4= Very much
1

2

3

4

5

I feel confident about my abilities.
I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure.
I feel satisfied with the way my body looks right now.
I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance.
I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read.
I feel that others respect and admire me.
I am dissatisfied with my weight.
I feel self-conscious.
I feel as smart as others.
I feel displeased with myself.
I feel good about myself.
I am pleased with my appearance right now.
I am worried about what other people think of me.
I feel confident that I understand things.
I feel inferior to others at this moment.
I feel unattractive.
I feel concerned about the impression I am making.
I feel that I have less scholastic ability right now than others.
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I feel that I am not doing well.
I am worried about looking foolish.
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DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Please provide the following background information.
Print Name: _____________________________________
SS#:________________________
Age: _________
Female
Race:

Height _____ Weight_____ Gender :

___Male

___

____ Caucasian
____ African-American
____ Hispanic
____ Native-American
____ Asian-American
____ Pacific Islander
____ Other _______________
(Please specify)

When others see me they think my Race is:
____ Caucasian
____ African-American
____ Hispanic
____ Native-American
____ Asian-American
____ Pacific Islander
____ Other _______________
(Please specify)
Marital Status (circle one): Single

Engaged
Married
Divorced
Widowed

I am a: (circle one):

sophomore

freshman

junior

Separated

senior

I am hearing impaired: Yes No
I wear glasses/contacts: Yes No
What was the income level for a year of your family of origin (home that you were raised
in).
Circle one :
Less than $10,000.00
$10,000.00 - $24,999.00
$25,000.00 - $39,999.00
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$40,000.00 - $79,999.00
Over $80,000.00
I do not know my family of origin’s household yearly income.
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APPENDIX D
Please use these definitions to answers the following questions.
Prejudice- an adverse judgment or opinion formed beforehand about a particular group,
race, or religion without knowledge or examination of the facts.
Discriminate- to make distinctions on the basis of class or category without regard to
individual merit; show preference.
Racism- the belief that race accounts for differences in human character or ability and
that a particular race is superior to others.
1= Strongly disagree
2= Disagree
3= Neither disagree or agree
4= Agree
5= Strongly agree
1

2

3

4

1.The rating I received from the graduate student was because of
my race
2.The rating I received from the graduate student was because of
my physical appearance (height, weight, etc.)
3. Physical disabilities caused the graduate student to evaluate me
differently.
4.The rating I received was due to the evaluator’s racial prejudice.
5.Discrimination contributed to the rating I received.
6.The other student was competent to rate my essay.
answer 7 only if #6 is “Disagree or Strongly disagree”
7. What features diminished the evaluator’s ability to rate you accurately:
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
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5

ESSAY Evaluation
This is a scale that is used to evaluate how well an essay is written. Below are specific
features that should be contained in an essay. Please evaluate the essay you were given
using the following scale:
1= Do not have this skill
3= Fair
5= Very Good

2= Poor
4= Good
6= Excellent
1

2

3

4

5

Formulating a Thesis or Main Idea statement which focuses
the essay.
Writing about a subject within a required amount of time for
a particular audience.
Arranging ideas and supporting details in an organizational
pattern.
Demonstrating effective word choice
(Avoiding inappropriate use of slang, jargon, and pretentious
expressions).
Developing effective sentence structure.
Maintaining a consistent point of view.
Using standard practice for spelling, punctuation, and
capitalization.
Revising, editing, and proofreading.
Writing such that all supporting material is relevant to the
thesis or main idea.
Using transitional phrases clearly to reflect the
organizational pattern.
Overall rating of Essay Writing Ability.
Comments:
_____________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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